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The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
as Jus Cogens
Gaela Normile*
ABSTRACT
As a result of the Manhattan Project, a secret nuclear weapons
program in 1946, the United States became the first nation in the world to
secure a nuclear weapon. Although the United States’ nuclear weapon
resulted in an international desire to attain similar capabilities, the leading
scientists of the Manhattan Project released a somber statement that first
reflected the destructive nature of nuclear weapons. The Manhattan
Project scientists warned that a “grave danger lies ahead” if the issues
associated with the weapon were not “carefully analyzed and discussed
with competent authorities.”
The statement released by the Manhattan Project scientists was the
first express statement made about the dangers that accompany nuclear
weapons and, incidentally, nuclear proliferation. The scientists’ grave
prediction came to fruition one month later, when two nuclear bombs
killed over 250,000 Japanese civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during
World War II.
After the World War II nuclear bombings, the Soviet Union secured
a nuclear weapon followed by the United Kingdom, France, and China.
Fearing further proliferation and possible catastrophic results if the nuclear
bomb fell into the wrong hands, the international community began to
heed to the Manhattan Project scientists’ warnings by carefully analyzing
and discussing nuclear non-proliferation. International discussions led to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970.
Currently, the NPT is the largest binding arms and limitation agreement as
191 out of 193 States are party to the treaty.
This Comment will argue that nuclear non-proliferation has attained
jus cogens status because of both its shared fundamental importance in the
international community as well as its universal acceptance and adherence.
Ultimately, this Comment will analyze the opinio juris that surrounds the
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norm, relevant treaties and resolutions, and ad hoc investigations that
contribute to the jus cogens status of the norm.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

When the name “Albert Einstein” comes to mind, the most common
association is Einstein’s theory of relativity and the infamous “E=mc2.”1
What some people may not realize is that Einstein played a critical role in
the development of the first nuclear weapon.2 In 1939, HungarianAmerican physicist, Leo Szilard, and German physicist, Albert Einstein,
wrote a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt encouraging the United
States to research and develop a nuclear bomb.3 Although it is unlikely the
atomic bomb would have been created without the contributions made by
Einstein, Szilard, and other physicists, these early scientists were also
paradoxically the most adamant against the proliferation and use of
nuclear weapons.4

1. See Tony Rothman, Was Einstein the First to Invent E=mc2?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 24,
2015), https://bit.ly/2J7ulsW.
2. See The Einstein-Szilard Letter-1939, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (July 18, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2MilVPu.
3. See Leo Szilard’s Fight to Stop the Bomb, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (July 15,
2016), https://bit.ly/2ZEMyET [hereinafter Leo Szilard’s Fight].
4. See id.
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Prior to the first and only use of a nuclear weapon by one State against
another State,5 Szilard vocalized his opposition and concerns about the
“disastrous geopolitical consequences” of an atomic bomb to James F.
Byrnes, then United States Secretary of State.6 Ultimately, Szilard was
unsuccessful in preventing the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. 7
Similarly, other prominent scientists, like J. Robert Oppenheimer,8 were
vehemently opposed to the proliferation and military use of nuclear
weapons.9
Although the scientific community was unable to dissuade States
from nuclear use and proliferation at the time the atomic bomb was
created, the international community began to heed such warnings in 1974,
after India successfully tested a nuclear weapon.10 In response to India’s
successful nuclear test, nuclear non-proliferation initiatives gained greater
international attention due to increasing pressures placed on nuclear
weapons States.11 Currently, 191 States are members to either one or more
treaties that restrict nuclear proliferation.12 Due to the fundamental
importance and increased universal adherence to the norm of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear non-proliferation has attained the status of a jus
cogens norm.13
Although the doctrine of jus cogens is intentionally vague to allow
for further development of the concept,14 Part II of this Comment will
attempt to concretely define jus cogens.15 Jus cogens will be defined
5. The United Nations uses the word “State” when referring to its members and
therefore this Comment will also use the term “State.” See Member States, UNITED
NATIONS, https://bit.ly/2mxlQw2 (last visited Aug. 6, 2019). In addition, the United States
is the only State that has used an atomic weapon against another State. See Leo Szilard’s
Fight, supra note 3. The United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan during WWII.
Id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. J. Robert Oppenheimer, also known as “the father of the atomic bomb,” was an
American physicist that contributed to the creation of the first atomic bomb through the
Manhattan Project. See J. Robert Oppenheimer, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND.,
https://bit.ly/2EnJwiq (last visited Jan. 28, 2019).
9. See id.
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. Nuclear weapons States are nations that are nuclear-armed. Kelsey Davenport &
Kingston Reif, Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (June
2018), https://bit.ly/1P4O892. These States include the United States, United Kingdom,
France, Israel, Pakistan, India, Russia, China, and North Korea. Id. In total, there are about
15,000 nuclear warheads in the world, with over 90% of those belonging to Russia and the
United States. Id. Out of the 15,000 nuclear warheads, 9,600 are in military service and the
rest are awaiting dismantlement. Id.
12. See infra Section II.C.1.
13. See infra Section II.A.
14. See Kamrul Hossain, The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the
U.N. Charter, 3 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 72, 73 (2005).
15. See infra Section II.A.
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through the examination of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties16 (“Vienna Convention”), commonly shared factors of jus cogens
norms, and caselaw.17 After examining and expanding upon the concept
of jus cogens, Part II will then begin to delve into a brief history of nuclear
weapons.18 The history of nuclear weapons will naturally begin with an
examination of the Manhattan Project, and end with a discussion about the
implications of India’s first successful nuclear weapons test.19 Part II will
then conclude by defining nuclear non-proliferation through relevant
international treaties and statements made by intergovernmental and
international organizations.20
Next, Part III will analyze the relations between nuclear nonproliferation and other well-accepted jus cogens norms.21 More
specifically, Part III will argue that nuclear non-proliferation has attained
the status of jus cogens in international law because of the opinio juris22
of States, the large number of treaties that utilize “heightened language”23
to signify the importance of the norm, and the significant number of States
that are parties to such relevant nuclear non-proliferation treaties.24
Additionally, this Comment will argue that while enforcement of the norm
against violators is minimal, such minimal enforcement is a common
feature of jus cogens norms.25 Finally, Part IV concludes by stressing the
importance of recognizing nuclear non-proliferation as jus cogens in the
international community.
16. The Vienna Convention, adopted in 1969, is a multilateral treaty. See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention]. The Convention has 116 State Parties and 45 signatory states, meaning these
states have not yet ratified the treaty. Id. The Convention promotes the peaceful settlement
of disputes by establishing the conditions necessary to maintain obligations between States
that are party to an international treaty. Id.
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. See infra Section II.B.
19. See infra Section II.B.
20. See infra Section II.C.
21. See infra Section II.A.1.
22. Opinio juris, short for opinio juris sive necessitates, is best defined as a “sense of
legal obligation” amongst States. In order for a State practice to rise to the level of binding
customary international law, opinio juris must accompany a general and consistent practice
by States. See Garcia v. Chapman, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing
United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2012)); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1987).
23. This analysis was influenced by the arguments written by a number of
commentators on jus cogens norms. In particular, the author relied heavily on a Comment
written by M. Cherif Bassiouni, former Emeritus Professor of Law at DePaul University.
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Comment, Accountability for International Crime and Serious
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: International Crimes: Jus Cogens and
Obligation Erga Omnes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996). Uncited statements are
the author’s original analysis or elaboration on the arguments made by commentators.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 66.
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BACKGROUND

The doctrine of jus cogens is derived from international law and
literally translates to “compelling law,”26 which is ironic given that the
doctrine lacks a clear definition of what norms are considered
compelling.27 Although the doctrine of jus cogens does not precisely
define criteria for norms to attain the status of compelling law, a general
consensus suggests that certain factors are shared amongst norms that
qualify as jus cogens.28 The following section will discuss commonly
identified factors of jus cogens,29 provide a brief history of the
development of nuclear weapons,30 and define nuclear non-proliferation
before arguing that nuclear non-proliferation is a jus cogens norm.31
A.

Jus Cogens

Jus cogens, otherwise known as peremptory norms, prevail over both
customary international law and treaties and, therefore, enjoy the “highest
status” of recognized international law.32 Simply put, jus cogens norms are
most typically understood as standards prohibiting crimes that affect the
global community because such crimes “threaten the peace and security of
humankind” and “shock the conscience of humanity.”33 Examples of jus
cogens norms include the prohibition of genocide, torture, and slavery.34
Jus cogens norms are codified by the Vienna Convention.35 Specifically,
the Vienna Convention states that “a treaty is void if . . . it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of international law.”36 Due to the peremptory nature and
universal adherence of jus cogens norms, derogation from a jus cogens
norm is not permitted.37 In other words, jus cogens are highly valued,

26. Hossain, supra note 14, at 73.
27. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 66th Sess., May. 5–June 6, July 7–Aug 2014, U.N.
Doc. A/69/10; U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2014) [hereinafter Int’l Law
Comm’n].
28. See Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 68.
29. See infra Section II.A.
30. See infra Section II.B.
31. See infra Section II.C.
32. Comm. United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
33. Other norms that meet the criteria of jus cogens include principles of the United
Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force, the prohibition of piracy, and other
fundamental human rights laws prohibiting genocide and slavery. See id. at 935.
34. . See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, U.N. Doc. A/5/10 [hereinafter Draft Articles].
35. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, at art. 66.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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fundamental norms that are universally recognized and adhered to by the
international community.38
Although jus cogens norms share similar qualities with customary
international law, the two concepts are distinguishable. In the hierarchical
structure of the types of binding international law, customary law is below
jus cogens norms, as universal adherence is not an element of customary
law.39 Due to a lack of universal adherence, customary law does not share
the same level of heightened importance as jus cogens norms in
international law.40
While these two forms of law are distinct from one another,
customary law and norms of jus cogens are nonetheless intertwined.41 For
example, while not all customary international laws are jus cogens, all jus
cogens norms are accepted as customary international law.42 To
understand the requisites necessary for customary international law to
attain the status of jus cogens, the concept of customary international law
must first be defined and analyzed.
Customary international law is defined as the “general and consistent
practice of [S]tates” that forms a sense of international legal obligation,
otherwise known as opinio juris.43 In other words, customary international
law forms a psychological obligation among States to adhere to a norm
because States have practiced the norm consistently for an extended period
of time.44 Additionally, according to the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”),45 State practice of the norm must be both “extensive and virtually
uniform . . . in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of
law or legal obligation is involved.”46 An example of customary
international law is the law of diplomatic immunities because the norm
“rested almost entirely on custom” between States before the law was

38. Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 67.
39. See Hossain, supra note 14, at 78–79.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See Garcia v. Chapman, 911 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing
United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2012)); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1987).
44. Jun-shik Hwang, A Sense and Sensibility of Legal Obligation: Customary
International Law and Game Theory, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 111, 118 (2006).
45. The ICJ is the “principal judicial organ” of the United Nations and is composed
of a body of fifteen independently elected judges. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, 1940 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 13. The ICJ may only hear cases between and by the
consent of States. Id. Therefore, the ICJ does not have jurisdiction over non-state actors
nor States that do not consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Id.
46. North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Rep. of Ger./Den. v. Fed. Rep. of Ger./Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. Rep. 12, 43 (Feb. 20); see also ANTONIO CASSESE, REALIZING UTOPIA: THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 139 (2012).
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codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.47 In order for
a norm of customary international law to rise to the level of jus cogens, the
international community as a whole must collectively recognize that the
norm “enshrines values so fundamental” that deviation is not permitted.48
Additionally, jus cogens norms are unlike customary international
law because, whereas a persistent objector49 can refrain from being bound
by customary international law, jus cogens norms are binding on all
nations regardless of a State’s consent to be bound.50 Unlike customary
international law, jus cogens norms do not “depend solely on the consent
of [S]tates” because such norms are derived from fundamental values
“deeply rooted in the international community.” 51 By contrast, customary
international law is derived from the “fortuitous or self-interested choices
of nations.”52 In short, States consent to be bound to customary
international law by choice because such norms are not as fundamentally
valued by the international community as jus cogens norms.53
Although jus cogens norms possess a higher status in
international law, the “contours and legal effects . . . remain illdefined and contentious” because little case law exists.54 Similarly,
although the concept of jus cogens is universally accepted, the precise
nature of jus cogens norms and the possible consequences of violating
such norms remain undefined and unclear.55 Commentators have argued
that jus cogens purposely remains unclear to allow for further development
of the legal concept.56 The paradox between the fundamental importance
of jus cogens norms and its undefined nature and scope is nonetheless
essential because the paradox allows for the development of jus cogens
norms as States begin to hold other norms as fundamental.
1.

Jus Cogens Factors

The starting point for analyzing and understanding jus cogens is the
Vienna Convention,57 which discusses the “basic elements of the nature,
47. See Daniel M. Bodansky, The Concept of Customary International Law, 16 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 667, 668 (1995).
48. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16, at art. 53.
49. A persistent objector is a state that is not bound to a rule of customary
international law because during the rule’s emergence, the state continuously and openly
opposed the rule. See Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle
of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 457 (1985).
50. See Siderman de Blake v. Rep. of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992).
51. Id. at 715; see also Hossain, supra note 14, at 73.
52. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 715.
53. See id.; see also Hossain, supra note 14, at 73.
54. See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 27.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Vienna Convention, supra note 16.
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requirements, and consequences of jus cogens.”58 The universal nature of
jus cogens is supported by Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which
requires States “as a whole” accept and adhere to jus cogens norms.59 In
addition, the Vienna Convention explains that a “consequence of a norm
acquiring the status of jus cogens is that treaties conflicting with [the
norm] are void.”60 Summarily, States cannot disregard or dispose of
adherence to a jus cogens norm by treaty because jus cogens norms are
higher than treaty law on the hierarchical ladder of international law.61
Frequently identified and shared factors among norms deemed jus
cogens in international law include:(1) opinio juris that recognition of
these norms are part of customary law; (2) language within relevant
treaties that reflect the higher status of these norms in international law;
(3) the large number of States that have signed and ratified treaties in
relation to these norms; and (4) the “ad hoc international investigations
and prosecutions of perpetrators of these crimes.” 62 Although these factors
are sufficient to define a norm as jus cogens, the list is not exhaustive.63
A widely accepted example of a jus cogens norm is the prohibition
of genocide.64 The universal and fundamental nature of the prohibition of
genocide is reflected in the ICJ’s65 opinion in Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (“DRC v. Rwanda”).66 In DRC v. Rwanda, the ICJ
reaffirmed the prohibition of genocide as binding on all States, regardless
of any “conventional obligation” because of the universality and erga
omnes67 nature of the norm.68 Additionally, the jus cogens status of the
prohibition of genocide is exemplified by the ICJ’s belief that cooperation
amongst all States is “required in order to liberate mankind from such an
odious scourge.”69 The ICJ’s use of this language confirms that the
prohibition of genocide is jus cogens because it reaffirms the notion that
jus cogens norms are international crimes that “threaten the peace and
security of humankind” and “shock the conscience of humanity.”70

58. Id.
59. Id. at art 53.
60. Id.
61. See Hossain, supra note 14, at 78.
62. Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 68.
63. See CASSESE, supra note 46, at 139.
64. See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 27.
65. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
66. See Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo
v. Rwanda), 1999 I.C.J. 129 (June 23) [hereinafter DRC v. Rwanda].
67. Erga omnes means “flowing to all” and usually accompanies the concept of jus
cogens because it is presumed that universal obligations imposed by jus cogens norms
“flow[] to all” nations. See Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 72.
68. See DRC v. Rwanda, 1999 I.C.J. at 129.
69. Id.
70. Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 69.
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Now that jus cogens has been defined and illustrated by a jus cogens
norm, the prohibition of genocide, the next section will discuss the history
and development of nuclear weapons.71 Examining the history and
development of nuclear weapons is essential to understand the nature of
such weapons and establish a basis of why the international community
universally promotes nuclear non-proliferation.
B.

The History of Nuclear Weapons

Prior to World War II, the United States received intelligence that
scientists working for Adolf Hitler were developing a nuclear weapon.72
In response to this intelligence, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
created a committee of scientists to study the uses of uranium as a
potential weapon.73 Shortly thereafter, in 1942, President Roosevelt
authorized the goal of weaponizing nuclear energy in what later became
known as the “Manhattan Project.”74
Three years after President Roosevelt authorized the Manhattan
Project and following heavy German losses in World War II, the United
States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom—otherwise known as
the “Big Three”75 heads of state—held the Potsdam Conference in
Potsdam, Germany.76 During the Conference, the United States directed
Japan to either surrender under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration or
face “prompt and utter destruction.”77 Due to Japan’s unwillingness to
accept the terms of the declaration, the United States deployed the “Little

71. See infra Section I.B.
72. Germany’s secret nuclear weapons program, called Uranverein or “uranium
club,” began after two German scientists, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann, accidentally
discovered fission, a type of nuclear reaction, with uranium. German Atomic Bomb
Project, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://bit.ly/2xXKawJ.
73. See Manhattan Project, HISTORY (Jul. 26, 2017), https://bit.ly/2SlCDAD.
74. The Manhattan Project was initiated and motivated by fear: “‘fear that the enemy
had the bomb, or would have it before [the United States] could develop it.’” See German
Atomic Bomb Project, supra note 72 (quoting Manhattan Project physicist, Leona Marshall
Libby).
75. The “Big Three,” also known as the “Grand Alliance,” was the collective name
given to the three leaders of the Allied powers of Great Britain, the United States, and the
Soviet Union. The Big Three, THE NAT’L WWII MUSEUM, https://bit.ly/2xbzPgU (last
visited Dec. 30, 2018). The “Big Three” included the Soviet Premier, Joseph Stalin; the
United States President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt; and the British Prime Minister,
Winston Churchill. Id.
76. During the Potsdam Conference, the Allied governments discussed both the
administration of post-World War II Germany and called for the unconditional surrender
of Japan in the “Potsdam Declaration.” Potsdam Declaration, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND.,
https://bit.ly/2WVE3DD (last visited Jan. 1, 2019).
77. Id.
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Boy”78 atomic bomb on Hiroshima.79 Three days after Little Boy was
detonated, the United States dropped the “Fat Man”80 atomic bomb on
Nagasaki after Japan had not yet surrendered.81 Not only did the two
nuclear bombs result in Japan’s ultimate surrender, but the bombs also
resulted in unprecedented damage, destruction, and over 100,000 Japanese
civilian deaths.82
The detrimental physical, psychological, and environmental effects
of the nuclear explosions of World War II halted the use of a nuclear
weapon by one nation against another nation. However, the development
of nuclear weapons also led to an international desire to attain nuclear
capabilities as an “international status symbol.”83 Due to the dual-use
nature84 of nuclear energy and technology, States began to acquire nuclear
weapons capabilities under the guise of “peaceful purposes.”85
In 1974, after India successfully tested a nuclear bomb and described
the detonation as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” the international
community began to advocate for more stringent limitations on nuclear
proliferation.86 States began to collectively work toward the promoting
nuclear non-proliferation fearing that countries, like India, would begin to
illegally use civilian nuclear facilities for nuclear weapons purposes.87
78. The “Little Boy” was a “gun-type device” that achieved critical mass—the
minimum amount of material necessary to start an explosive chain reaction—when a subcritical uranium projectile fired through a gun barrel at another subcritical uranium target.
Little Boy and Fat Man, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (July 23, 2014), https://bit.ly/2zkeNjp.
The “Little Boy” was the first nuclear weapon used in a war. Id.
79. Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (June 5, 2014),
https://bit.ly/2zcNM0i.
80. “Fat Man” was an “implosion-type bomb” and was the second of its kind. See
Little Boy and Fat Man, supra note 78. The first was the “Gadget” which was the first
successful nuclear device tested in the world and was created as a result of the Manhattan
Project. Trinity Test-1945, ATOMIC HERITAGE FOUND. (June 18, 2014),
https://bit.ly/2mlikoR.
81. See Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, supra note 79.
82. See id.
83. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1371
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
84. Dual-use technology is technology that can be used for both legitimate purposes,
like generating nuclear power, as well as illegitimate purposes, like the creation of nuclear
weapons. Charles Ferguson, Proliferation Risks of Nuclear Power Programs, NUCLEAR
THREAT INITIATIVE (Dec. 1, 2007), https://bit.ly/2RsaRmP.
85. While there is no specific definition of the conditions necessary to constitute
“peaceful purposes” of nuclear energy, the IAEA has implemented and monitored national
programs that utilize “nuclear techniques” in medicine, agriculture, stock breeding, food,
hydrology, and the study of renewable energy sources. Hans Blix, Int’l Atomic Energy
Agency [IAEA], The Peaceful and Safe Uses of Nuclear Energy, IAEA (Apr. 25, 1996),
https://bit.ly/2Y6BRKZ.
86. NTI India Nuclear, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, https://bit.ly/2PbiRXv (last
visited Oct. 2, 2018).
87. See Leonard Weiss, U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation, 14 NONPROLIFERATION
REV. 429 (2007).
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Additionally, while India was testing nuclear weapons, Pakistan was also
developing and testing a nuclear weapon.88 In response to a/the growing
fear that nuclear proliferation would lead to an environmental and
humanitarian disaster if not controlled and prohibited, States began
“nonproliferation initiatives of considerable breadth and vigor.”89
C.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Nuclear non-proliferation prohibits the transfer and
reception of nuclear weapons capabilities between nuclear weapons
States90 and non-nuclear weapons States.91 States are still legally allowed
to provide “special fissionable material”92 and equipment necessary for the
production or use of fissionable material to another State, as long as the
material and equipment are transferred or received for “peaceful
purposes.”93 Similarly, States that seek to transfer and receive such nuclear
capabilities for peaceful purposes are subject to specific safeguards.94
The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(“NPT”) aimed to prevent wider dissemination of nuclear weapons and
promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through international
cooperation.95 The NPT is considered a “landmark international treaty”
88. See id.
89. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1372
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 587, at 2–3 (1977)).
90. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
91. In other words, nuclear non-proliferation is the concept of preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons between States that possess nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons States,
and States that do not possess nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapon States. See Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
92. Special fissionable material is a nuclide that is capable of undergoing a chain of
nuclear reactions after capturing either high-energy neutrons or low-energy thermal
neutrons. See Nuclide, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, https://bit.ly/2x83p73 (last updated
July 6, 2018); see also Fissionable Material, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N,
https://bit.ly/2xbk5dE (last updated July 6, 2018). In other words, fissionable materials are
the isotopes of chemical elements that are able to create a nuclear explosion through a chain
of reactions caused by fission. See Fissionable Material, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N,
https://bit.ly/2xbk5dE (last updated July 6, 2018).
93. See NPT, supra note 91.
94. Specific safeguards are set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(“IAEA”) and are used to “verify a State’s compliance” to “accept safeguards on all nuclear
material” used for peaceful activities and to “verify that such material is not diverted to
nuclear weapons.” Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001
Edition, at 13, 16, IAEA/NVS/3 (2002), https://bit.ly/2N99QS2. Safeguards are
determined by agreements between the State and the IAEA and may include not only
nuclear material, but also non-nuclear material, services, equipment, facilities, and
information. See IAEA Safeguards Agreements, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
https://bit.ly/2LF5zjM (last visited Sept. 30, 2018) (stating that the IAEA has “concluded
comprehensive safeguards agreements with 174 States”).
95. See NPT, supra note 91.
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because of its focus on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons,
promoting “peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” and its ultimate goal of
achieving nuclear disarmament.96 Further, as evidence of the treaty’s
landmark importance, the NPT is the “only binding commitment in a
multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon
States.”97
Although the NPT may be the largest legally binding commitment of
nuclear non-proliferation, the evolution of nuclear non-proliferation to its
current state is best analyzed by discussing international and regional
treaties that address nuclear testing and nuclear non-proliferation.
1.

International and Regional Treaties

Treaties are a source of binding international law between States that
“create rights and obligations for the parties to them” and stipulate specific
arrangements relating to the interests of the parties.98 Additionally, treaties
may act as “general legislation” because they “establish[] broad rules . . .
[that] govern state conduct.”99
Two of the earliest treaties that discuss nuclear weapons, the
Antarctic Treaty100 and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, Outer Space, and Under Water (“Partial Test Ban Treaty”),101
focus almost exclusively on the testing of nuclear weapons.102 Although
the Partial Test Ban Treaty specifically focuses on preventing and
prohibiting nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and
underwater, the underlying objective of the treaty is an “agreement on
general and complete disarmament [of nuclear weapons] under strict

96. Id.
97. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), U.N. OFF. FOR
DISARMAMENT AFFS., https://bit.ly/2gxxd2j (last visited Jan. 6, 2019).
98. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INT’L LAW, NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 35 (Erwin
Chemerinsky et al. eds., 4th ed. 2015).
99. Id. at 36.
100. The Antarctic Treaty was signed in December 1959 by the twelve countries who
were active in and around Antarctica. See Antarctic Treaty art. 5, Dec. 1, 1961, 12 U.S.T.
794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. The Antarctic Treaty provided that Antarctica be used for peaceful
purposes, like scientific research, and specifically prohibited nuclear explosions. See id. at
art. 1.
101. The Partial Test Ban Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, entered into force
between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom in October 1963.
See Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water,
NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Oct. 26, 2011), https://bit.ly/2QvTEuI. The Partial Test Ban
Treaty prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water to protect
those environments. See id.
102. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 100, at art. 5; see also Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T.
1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Partial Test Ban Treaty].
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international control.”103 Further, the Partial Test Ban Treaty signifies the
beginning of an international desire for nuclear disarmament, an important
objective, and result of non-proliferation.104
Similarly, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (“NWFZ”)105 treaties
encourage “regional approach[es] to strengthen global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament norms.”106 Ultimately, according to the
United Nations General Assembly, NWFZ treaties enhance the security of
States and contribute “to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and to the goals of complete and general disarmament.”107 A
significant proportion of the world is covered by NWFZ regional treaties,
as reflected by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean (“Treaty of Tlatelolco”),108 the South Pacific
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (“Treaty of Rarotonga”),109 the Treaty
on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (“Bangkok Treaty”),110
the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (“Pelindaba Treaty”),111
103. Partial Test Ban Treaty, supra note 102.
104. The United Nations believes that disarmament and non-proliferation must go
“hand-in-hand” in order to achieve the goal of eliminating nuclear proliferation and,
eventually, nuclear weapons. See Need to Preserve Global Non-Proliferation Regime
Stressed in Security Council, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 26, 2018), https://bit.ly/2DvdQHy
[hereinafter Need to Preserve].
105. Nuclear-weapon-free zone regional treaties are important to analyze because
they “contribute to the security of members of such zones [and] to the prevention of
proliferation of nuclear weapons.” See G.A. Res. 3472 B (XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
Supp. No. 27A, U.N. Doc. A/10027/Add.1, at 23 (Dec. 11, 1975).
106. See Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS.,
https://bit.ly/2z82y7z (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
107. G.A. Res. 3472 B (XXX), supra note 105, at 23.
108. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean, opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326 [hereinafter Treaty of
Tlatelolco].
109. The Treaty of Rarotonga entered into force in 1986 and thirteen out of the sixteen
regional members have ratified the treaty. See South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,
opened for signature Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S. 177, 24 I.L.M. 1440 [hereinafter Treaty
of Rarotonga]. These members include Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New
Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
See South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS.,
https://bit.ly/2x7JoNM (last visited on Jan. 13, 2019).
110. The Bangkok Treaty entered into force in 1997 and all ten regional States have
ratified the treaty. See Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, opened for
signature Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635 [hereinafter Bangkok Treaty]. These members
include Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. See Treaty on the
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS.,
https://bit.ly/2nbgbLd (last visited Jan. 13, 2019); Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-FreeZone Treaty, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Apr. 30, 2018), https://bit.ly/2WU8IRW.
111. The Treaty of Pelindaba entered into force in 2009 and 51 States, out of the
continent’s 53 States, are signatories. See African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,
opened for signature Apr. 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698 [hereinafter Treaty of Pelindaba].
Additionally, 40 States out of the 51 signatory States have ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba.

CMT 4 - THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS - NORMILE (DO NOT DELETE)

290

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

10/22/2019 4:56 PM

[Vol. 124:1

and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
(“CANWFZ”).112
Although examining relevant international and regional treaties is
crucial to defining and understanding the concept of nuclear nonproliferation, relevant international and intergovernmental organizations
must also be analyzed to understand the enforcement and implementation
of the norm.
2.

Intergovernmental and International Organizations

In 1996, the United Nations’ ICJ113 became the first
intergovernmental organization to discuss the legality of nuclear
weapons.114 In an advisory opinion, On the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ determined that nuclear weapons are illegal
and concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is “contrary to the
rules of international law.”115 Although the ICJ judges split on the ultimate
issue of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the judges
unanimously agreed that an international obligation to pursue nuclear
disarmament exists.116
Since the ICJ’s 1996 advisory opinion, the United Nations General
Assembly (“UNGA”) has adopted five resolutions relating to nuclear
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.117 The UNGA adopted the
first resolution, Resolution 67/56, in 2012, and adopted the remaining four
resolutions annually thereafter.118 Each resolution has the same general
objective: to encourage “nuclear disarmament negotiations for the
achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.”119
Although the resolutions have the same general goals, the desire for

See African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Apr. 20,
2018), https://bit.ly/2J5h3NC.
112. See Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia, Sept. 8, 2006, U.N.
Secretariat No. 51633, https://bit.ly/2NgDp4m [hereinafter Treaty of Semipalantinsk].
113. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1940 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 13;
see also text accompanying supra note 45.
114. See On the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
115. Id. at 266.
116. See id. at 267.
117. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, United Nations General Assembly
resolutions are “formal expressions of the opinion or will of UN organs” and, therefore,
not binding on States. Are UN Resolutions Binding?, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY (Apr.
26, 2018), https://bit.ly/2ZE1QK8.
118. G.A. Res. 67/56, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/56 (Dec. 3, 2012); see also G.A. Res.
68/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/46 (Dec. 5, 2013); G.A. Res. 69/41, U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/41
(Dec. 2, 2014); G.A. Res. 70/33, U.N. Doc. A/RES/70/33 (Dec. 7, 2015); G.A. Res. 71/258,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/71/258 (Dec. 23, 2016).
119. Id.
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universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is most apparent in
the latest resolution, Resolution 71/258.120
For example, in Resolution 71/258 the General Assembly added
provisions reflecting the universality of the norm by stating that the
international community is “deeply concerned about the catastrophic
humanitarian consequences” of nuclear weapons.121 Use of such language
supports the notion that nuclear non-proliferation is a universally
fundamental norm because of the potentially catastrophic consequences of
a nuclear weapon are indiscriminate and a direct result of nuclear
proliferation. Additionally, universal promotion and enforcement of the
norm is suggested by Resolution 71/258’s provision that directs States to
“make every effort to avert the danger” of nuclear war by recalling
obligations under the NPT.122 Further, the fundamental nature of nuclear
non-proliferation is supported in Resolution 71/258 because the resolution
repetitively stresses the “urgency of securing substantive progress” on
non-proliferation initiatives.123
In addition to the ICJ and the UNGA, the International Atomic
Energy Agency (“IAEA”) is a particularly important international
organization within the United Nations because it specifically promotes
nuclear non-proliferation.124 In response to President Eisenhower’s
riveting “Atoms for Peace” 125 speech given to the UNGA in 1957, the
international community established the IAEA under the IAEA Statute.126
The IAEA Statute,127 which 81 United Nations Members unanimously
approved in 1956,128 promotes and ensures the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy by “establish[ing] and administer[ing] safeguards designed to
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See About Us, INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, https://bit.ly/2Fr7hEE (last
visited Jan. 3, 2019).
125. In “Atoms for Peace,” President Eisenhower called for the repurpose of nuclear
technology from one of weaponry to one of peaceful, beneficial purposes. See Dwight D.
Eisenhower, U.S. President, Address to the U.N.G.A: Atoms for Peace (Dec. 8, 1953),
available at https://bit.ly/2rkvhTZ. One of the most influential lines from the speech that
led to the repurposing of nuclear technology was that the world should “devote its entire
heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not
be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.” Id.
126. See History, IAEA, https://bit.ly/2X3wtfl (last visited Jan. 3, 2019).
127. The IAEA Statute is the instrument that provides the agency with the power to
monitor the peaceful use of nuclear energy and implement safeguards with UN Member
States. See id. The IAEA Statue defines the objectives of the agency’s mission, which is to
promote and control nuclear energy. Id.
128. Although there are currently 193 members of the United Nations, there were
only 81 members of the United Nations when the IAEA Statute was presented to the United
Nations General Assembly in October of 1956. See id.; see also Growth in United Nations
Membership, UNITED NATIONS, https://bit.ly/2Jrqp9G (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
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ensure that special fissionable and other materials . . . are not used . . . to
further any military purpose,” including nuclear weapons.129 The IAEA
plays a vital role in the nuclear non-proliferation regime because the
agency conducts verification measures, inspections, and creates
comprehensive safeguards.130 In addition, the IAEA is included in nearly
all international and regional non-proliferation treaties, which signals its
success in promoting and enforcing nuclear non-proliferation as a norm.131
Although the IAEA’s role in the international community increased
through the NPT,132 the IAEA’s membership is unlike the NPT because
the IAEA implements safeguards in three States that are not party to the
NPT—India, Pakistan, and Israel.133
Now that the concepts of jus cogens and nuclear non-proliferation
have been defined and exemplified through treaties, international
organizations, and case law, the following section will analyze the two
concepts in tandem to support the argument that the norm of nonproliferation has attained jus cogens status. Ultimately, the argument will
highlight that nuclear non-proliferation has attained jus cogens status by
analyzing the norm in relation to four frequently shared and identified
factors of jus cogens norms.134
III.

ANALYSIS

Although jus cogens norms lack scholarly consensus on the
characteristics or qualities necessary to define a norm as jus cogens,135
sufficient legal basis exists to identify certain international crimes, like
nuclear proliferation, as jus cogens.136 Nuclear non-proliferation has
attained the status as a peremptory jus cogens norm because of (1) State
practice and express statements that reflect opinio juris, (2) the heightened
language in relevant treaties and resolutions137 that reinforce nuclear nonproliferation’s higher status in international law, (3) the vast number of
States that have signed and ratified treaties related to nuclear nonproliferation, and (4) the ad hoc international investigations of perpetrators
of nuclear proliferation.138

3.

129. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Jul. 29, 1957, 276 U.N.T.S.

130. See IAEA Safeguards Overview, INT’L ATOMIC
https://bit.ly/1Ku9Eku (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).
131. See id.
132. See NPT, supra note 91.
133. See About Us, supra note 124.
134. See infra Part III.
135. See supra Section II.A.
136. See Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 68.
137. See supra Section II.C.2.
138. See Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 68.

ENERGY

AGENCY,
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Opinio Juris on Nuclear Proliferation

Opinio juris is a sense of legal obligation amongst States that
contributes to the formation of a norm as customary international law.139
The opinio juris of States in relation to nuclear non-proliferation reflects
an international sense of legal obligation to undertake measures to prohibit
the proliferation of nuclear weapons among States.140 This sense of legal
obligation is manifested through the action and express statements of the
States.141
1.

State Action

As an example of opinio juris in relation to nuclear non-proliferation,
over 140 States hold voluntary agreements with the IAEA.142 Agreements
between the IAEA and States are seen as a “fundamental component of
the nuclear non-proliferation” regime because such agreements promote
confidence and create assurances that States are complying with
obligations that support nuclear non-proliferation.143 Such agreements
with the IAEA demonstrate non-proliferation’s universal, fundamental
importance in the international community. Indeed, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea’s (“North Korea”) is the only nuclear weapons
State, out of a total of nine nuclear weapons States, that does not hold an
agreement with the IAEA.144
Although North Korea does not yet hold an agreement with the IAEA
and is not currently a member of the NPT, recent North Korean action has
begun to reflect a sense of opinio juris145 supporting non-proliferation. The
diplomatic discussions of denuclearization between United States
President, Donald J. Trump, and North Korean Chairman, Kim Jong Un,
was welcomed and hailed by the international community as a “milestone”
for enhancing non-proliferation steps in North Korea.146 Similarly, China
139. See supra Section II.A.; see also Jo Lynn Slama, Opinio Juris in Customary
International Law, 15 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603, 605 (1990).
140. Supra Section II.A.
141. See Slama, supra note 139, at 656.
142. See Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Jul. 29, 1957, 276
U.N.T.S. 3
143. For example, Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, expressed that the
IAEA and the international community can work “hand-in-hand” on non-proliferation. See
Need to Preserve, supra note 104.
144. See IAEA Safeguards Overview, supra note 130.
145. See supra Section II.A.I.
146. Martin Vazvarra Cornejo, president of Peru; Daniel Kablan Duncan, vice
president of Côte d’lvoire; Mark Rutte, prime minister of the Netherlands; Kairat
Abdrakhmanov, Kazakhstan’s minister of foreign affairs; Margot Wallström, Sweden’s
minister of foreign affairs; and Andrzej Duda, president of Poland were among the
representatives that vocally praised the diplomatic talks between the United States and
North Korea. Id.
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has undertaken initiatives toward North Korean denuclearization by
facilitating dialogue on the Korean Peninsula.147
Additionally, Iran, a State that has been vocal about its desire to attain
a nuclear weapon, entered into a multilateral agreement, the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”), that aims to prevent nuclear
weapons proliferation in Iran.148 The JCPOA, otherwise known as the
“Iran Nuclear Deal,” is an agreement between Iran and the permanent five
(“P5”) members149 of the UN Security Council.150 The JCPOA is intended
to promote nuclear non-proliferation by guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear
programs are strictly used for peaceful purposes.151
To ensure that Iran complies with its obligations of non-proliferation,
the JCPOA lays a comprehensive framework that sets specific prohibitions
on activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear
weapon.152 In addition, the stringent verification and compliance measures
of the JCPOA are implemented and monitored by the IAEA.153 Although
the United States’ recent withdrawal from the JCPOA154 may appear to
undermine the universality and fundamental importance of nuclear nonproliferation, the United States “still retain[s] the same objectives” with
the rest of the world, which is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons to Iran.155
2.

Express Statements of States

Additionally, the collective opinio juris in support of nuclear nonproliferation in the international community is best demonstrated by the
various statements made by heads of States and representatives to the UN
Security Council in its 8,362nd meeting on September 26, 2018.156 The
focus of the meeting was on the preservation of the global non147. As expressed by Wang Yi, China’s minister foreign affairs, during the 8,362
meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Id.
148. See Kelsey Davenport, The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a
Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N (May 2018), https://bit.ly/2rrNekO.
149. The P5 members of the UN Security Council include China, the Russian
Federation, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See Davenport, supra note 148.
154. The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in May of 2018 because of the
belief that the agreement was “one-sided” and that the agreement did not do enough to
enforce non-proliferation. See Need to Preserve, supra note 104.
155. As expressed by Emmanuel Macron, president of France, during the 8,362nd
meeting of the United Nations Security Council. See id.
156. China, the Russian Federation, Bolivia, Peru, Côte d’Ivoire, the Netherlands,
Kuwait, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Sweden, France, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States were all represented at the 8362nd meeting of the UN Security Council. See
id.
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proliferation regime in light of various activities that occurred in 2018.157
Although the representatives at the UN Security Council were unable to
come to a consensus on the most effective method of encouraging nonproliferation of nuclear weapons,158 all nations expressed unanimity in
preserving and enforcing non-proliferation.159 Non-proliferation’s
fundamental importance is “abundantly clear”160 and the “collective
effort”161 necessary to prevent nuclear proliferation demonstrates the
universality of the norm.
Express statements by State leaders reflecting the importance of
nuclear non-proliferation is not a recent phenomenon. The fundamental
importance of the norm was conveyed by the White House Press Secretary
in 1996, Mike McCurry (“McCurry”).162 McCurry stated in a press release
that the United States’ signing of both the Treaty of Rarotonga163 and
Treaty of Pelindaba164 clearly established the United States’ “commitment
to nuclear nonproliferation” and regional NWFZ165 treaties.166 Similarly,
Kang Yong (“Yong”), the Counsellor for China at the Preparatory
Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference,167 reinforced the
importance of regional non-proliferation treaties.168 Yong stated that
157. These activities include Syria’s chemical weapon use against its own citizens;
the chemical weapon attack in Salisbury, England; the United States’ withdrawal from the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA); and the diplomatic discussions between the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”) and the United States. See id.
158. The various methods of eliminating nuclear proliferation include complete
destruction of all nuclear weapons, as expressed by Peru; nuclear-based sanctions, as
expressed by the United States and France; diplomacy and confidence-building measures,
as expressed by Kazakhstan and Ethiopia; and rules-based, treaty enforcement, as
expressed by the Netherlands, Equatorial Guinea, and Kuwait. Id.
159. See id.
160. Id. (quoting Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of the Netherlands).
161. See Need to Preserve, supra note 104 (quoting Andrzej Duda, President of
Poland).
162. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement on South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (Mar. 23, 1996), 1996 WL 128061; Press Release, Office of the
Press Secretary, Africa Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty and Fact Sheet (Apr. 11, 1996),
1996 WL 169211.
163. See Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 109.
164. See Treaty of Pelindaba, supra note 111.
165. See Supra Section II.C.I.
166. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Joint Statement on South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone (Mar. 23, 1996), 1996 WL 128061; see also Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary, Africa Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty and Fact Sheet (Apr. 11,
1996), 1996 WL 169211.
167. The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (“NPT Review Conference”) was established in 1975 and meets every
five years to review the implementation of the NPT. See NPT Review Conferences, INT’L
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, https://bit.ly/2LcqI7F (last visited Jan. 4, 2019).
168. See Kang Yong, Counsellor, China, Statement at the Preparatory Committee for
the 2010 NPT Review Conference: On the Issue of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (May 7,
2009), https://bit.ly/2ICgAnj.
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“nuclear-weapon-free zones [are] an important step toward the goal of a
world free of nuclear weapons.”169 State actions and statements contribute
to nuclear non-proliferation’s jus cogens status because they reflect opinio
juris amongst the international community that nuclear non-proliferation
is of fundamental importance.
B.

Treaty Analysis

Currently, close to half170 of all multilateral treaties that relate to arms
regulation and disarmament agreements have provisions that relate to
nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons.171 No other weapon or method
of weaponization is as heavily regulated or addressed in multilateral
treaties as nuclear weapons and nuclear energy.172 Although a significant
number of regulations and disarmament treaties address the weaponization
of nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation, this number is not sufficient
on its own to justify the argument that nuclear non-proliferation has
attained the status of jus cogens.173 However, the heightened language174
and volume of States that have ratified non-proliferation treaties
demonstrate the jus cogens status of the norm.175
The most significant treaty in the nuclear non-proliferation regime is
the NPT,176 which entered into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely
in 1995.177 Out of the 193 States recognized by the United Nations, a total
of 191 States have joined the NPT, making it the most ratified arms
regulation and disarmament agreement of any treaty.178 Statements and
provisions in the NPT, requiring the “cooperation of all States” and
“strengthening of trust between States,” reflects the universality of the
norm against nuclear proliferation.179 Additionally, the provision,
169. Id.
170. Thirteen out of the twenty-seven multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament
Agreements have provisions that pertain to nuclear weapons and, or nuclear proliferation.
Disarmament Treaties Database, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS.,
https://bit.ly/2igYMxj (last visited Jan. 13, 2019). These treaties include the Antarctic
Treaty, Bangkok Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Moon Treaty (Celestial
Bodies), Outer Space Treaty, Partial Test Ban Treaty, Pelindaba Treaty, Sea-Bed Treaty,
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Treaty of Tlatelolco, Treaty on a NuclearWeapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (CANWFZ), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See supra Section II.A.
174. See supra Section II.C.2.
175. See supra Section II.C.2.
176. See supra Section II.C.2.
177. See NPT, supra note 91.
178. See Disarmament Treaties Database, supra note 170.
179. See NPT, supra note 91.
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“[c]onsidering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by
a nuclear war,” reflects an understanding of the threat nuclear proliferation
poses to the peace and security of mankind, a common characteristic of
jus cogens norms.180 The NPT has been credited with keeping the number
of States that possess nuclear weapons low for the last fifty years.181 As
expressed by the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, the world
“can only imagine how much conflict, instability and violence [the NPT]
has prevented” by encouraging and enforcing non-proliferation
measures.182
In addition to the NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco demonstrates the
contribution of NWFZ regional treaties183 to nuclear non-proliferation’s
attainment of jus cogens status. Currently, all 33 states in Latin America
and the Caribbean are members of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which “is of a
permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely.”184 The
unanimous support for the Treaty of Tlatelolco evinces that Latin
American and Caribbean States share a deeply rooted belief that nuclear
non-proliferation is jus cogens.185
The Treaty of Tlatelolco also requires Latin American and Caribbean
signatory States to “keep their territories forever free from nuclear
weapons” because of the “incalculable destructive power” nuclear
weapons possess.186 The Treaty of Tlatelolco stresses that in order to keep
regional territories free from nuclear weapons and decrease the danger of
a “nuclear conflagration,” States must impose upon themselves
prohibitions on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.187 Language like
“forever free,” “destructive power,” and “nuclear conflagration” are just a
few examples of the heightened language used throughout the treaty to
describe the threatening and shocking nature of nuclear proliferation.188
Additionally, the Treaty of Tlatelolco acknowledges that prohibiting and
preventing the “testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition” of

180. See id.; see also supra Section II.A.
181. See Need to Preserve, supra note 104.
182. Id.
183. See supra Section II.C.1.
184. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Apr. 30, 2018), https://bit.ly/2ZEP3XN; see also
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Comment on Latin America Nuclear-Free
Zone Treaty (Jan. 21, 1994), 1994 WL 14667 (stating that the Treaty of Tlatelolco would
“strengthen the security of countries” and “reinforce the worldwide nonproliferation
regime”).
185. See supra Section II.A.
186. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 108.
187. Id.
188. See supra Section II.A.
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nuclear weapons would contribute significantly toward the ultimate
prevention of international nuclear proliferation.189
Further, although not yet in force, the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons is the most recent multilateral treaty that addresses
nuclear non-proliferation.190 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons uses unprecedented provisions in arms limitation and
disarmament agreements, thus contributing to the fundamental nature and
higher status of non-proliferation as a jus cogens norm.
For example, under Article I of the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons, a State Party undertakes to “never under any
circumstances” develop, test, transfer, receive, use, or threaten to use a
nuclear weapon.191 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is
unprecedented because it requires each “State Party [to] encourage States
not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve[,] or accede to the
Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence” and is not subject to
reservations.192 Unlike other non-proliferation treaties, the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons sets strict standards on a State Party to
eliminate nuclear weapons capabilities and stockpiles.193 The strict
standards imposed by the Treaty, as well as the prohibition of reservations
to the Treaty,194 demonstrates nuclear non-proliferation’s significant status
in the international community.
The NPT, Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons exemplify the jus cogens status of nuclear nonproliferation. The shocking nature and international threat195 nuclear
proliferation poses to the world is reflected in the heightened language

189. The Treaty of Tlatelolco’s potential to significantly contribute to the ultimate
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons was strengthened by Additional
Protocols I and II, enacted after the NPT, which sought to strengthen the Latin American
and Caribbean commitment of non-proliferation as a “means of achieving general and
complete disarmament.” See Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 108.
190. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by a vote of 112
States by the United Nations on July 7, 2017. See Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., https://bit.ly/2meEU2E (last visited Oct.
30, 2018). However, the treaty will not enter into force until after the fiftieth instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession has been deposited. See id. As of 2018,
there are 69 Signatory States, with only nineteen of those 69 States actually party to the
treaty. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. . Reservations are “unilateral statement[s]” that allow a State to “exclude or to
modify the legal effect of certain provisions” of a treaty’s application to that State. Vienna
Convention, supra note 16, at art. 2 (1)(d). By prohibiting reservations, the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons seeks to strictly and universally enforce all of its
provisions.
195. See supra Section II.A.
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utilized in each treaty.196 In addition, the fundamental importance of
promoting and enforcing the norm of non-proliferation is reinforced by the
considerable number of arms regulation and disarmament agreements that
address the norm. Further, the universality of nuclear non-proliferation is
reflected by the 191 States that are members of relevant treaties and
agreements.197
C.

Ad Hoc Investigations of Perpetrators

One method of determining what actions constitute international
crimes that violate norms of jus cogens is identifying crimes that “affect
the interests of the world community as a whole.”198 Crimes that affect the
world community are crimes undertaken by a State that (1) “threaten the
peace and security of humankind” because they (2) “shock the conscience
of humanity.”199 Additionally, jus cogens norms impose duties on States,
not optional rights, which imply a “duty to prosecute” violators of
international crimes that rise to the level of jus cogens.200 In practice, States
frequently grant impunity for jus cogens crimes, thus creating a “gap
between legal expectations and legal reality.”201 This gap between
expectation and reality may be attributed to the intentionally undefined
nature of jus cogens to allow for other norms to rise to the level of jus
cogens as States begin to hold other norms as fundamentally
peremptory.202
Analyzing international investigations and prosecutions of
perpetrators of nuclear proliferation is difficult because, like other jus
cogens norms, little case law exists.203 Examining the international
community’s investigations of the A.Q. Khan Network suggests that
nuclear proliferation is a jus cogens crime that affects the world
community as a whole.
The A.Q. Khan Network was the name given to a Pakistani nuclear
scientist, Abdul Qadeer (“A.Q.”) Khan, and his associates that engaged in
nuclear proliferation activities during the 1970s.204 The A.Q. Khan
Network is infamous for developing a successful nuclear weapon in

196. See supra Section III.B.
197. See Disarmament Treaties Database, supra note 165.
198. Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 69.
199. Id. at 69.
200. Id. at 65–66.
201. Id. at 66.
202. See Supra Part II.A.
203. See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 27.
204. See Chronology: A.Q. Khan, N.Y. TIMES
https://nyti.ms/2X1BJLH.

(Apr.

16,

2006),

CMT 4 - THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS - NORMILE (DO NOT DELETE)

300

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

10/22/2019 4:56 PM

[Vol. 124:1

Pakistan and proliferating nuclear weapons technology and designs to Iran
and North Korea.205
In 1972, A.Q. Khan worked at the Physical Dynamic Research
Laboratory (“FDO”), a Dutch research facility and subcontractor of the
Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (“UCN”), a Dutch nuclear facility.206 While
Khan worked at the FDO, Dutch intelligence began to monitor his
activities after he began inquiring into nuclear technical information
unrelated to his own projects.207 After three years of working at the Dutch
FDO, and soon after he asked a series of “suspicious questions” at a
nuclear trade show in Switzerland, A.Q. Khan fled to Pakistan with
centrifuge blueprints and began working with the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission (“PAEC”).208
In 1983, eight years after fleeing the Netherlands with centrifuge
blueprints, A.Q. Khan was convicted in a Dutch court, in absentia, for
“conducting nuclear espionage.”209 A.Q. Khan’s conviction was
overturned on appeal because the Dutch court determined that A.Q. Khan
was not properly summoned.210 After nearly two decades of receiving and
transferring nuclear weapons technology, information, and training to
other countries,211 A.Q. Khan was forced to publicly confess to his nuclear
proliferation crimes in 2004.212 Ultimately, A.Q. Khan served only five
years of house arrest and was pardoned of his proliferation crimes by
Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf.213
The rest of the world, however, heavily criticized the leniency Khan
received.214 For example, upon A.Q. Khan’s release from house arrest, the
Obama administration asked Pakistan for assurances that Khan would be
prohibited from returning to nuclear-related work and activity.215 Although

205. See Catherine Collins & Douglas Frantz, The Long Shadow of A.Q. Khan,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan. 31, 2018), https://fam.ag/2X3gDMY.
206. See Chronology: A.Q. Khan, supra note 204.
207. See Collins & Frantz, supra note 205.
208. See id.
209. Craig S. Smith, Roots of Pakistan Atomic Scandal Traced to Europe, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 19, 2004), https://nyti.ms/2Y6ReDp.
210. See Collins & Frantz, supra note 205.
211. Countries that are believed to have benefitted from the A.Q. Khan Network,
other than Pakistan, include North Korea, Iran, and Libya. See id. However, Libya never
successfully tested nor attained a nuclear weapon and renounced its nuclear weapons
program in December 2003. Id. Additionally, an Iraqi memo found in 1995 indicates that
A.Q. Khan may have offered nuclear assistance to Iraq. Id. However, Khan was ultimately
unable to assist Iraq because Iraq rejected the offer. Id.
212. See id.
213. See Leonard S. Spector, Punishing A.Q. Khan, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 10, 2009),
https://bit.ly/2ICbfMC.
214. Joby Warrick, Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan Is Freed From House Arrest, WASH.
POST (Feb. 7, 2009), https://wapo.st/2ZEFnN1.
215. See id.
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Pakistan has promised that it will take “all necessary measures to promote
the goals of nonproliferation,”216 Pakistan’s minimal punishment of A.Q.
Khan demonstrates the gap between the legal expectation and legal
reality217 for violators of jus cogens norms.
D.

Recommendation

Ultimately, the international community should begin to recognize
nuclear non-proliferation as a jus cogens norm because, like other jus
cogens norms, nuclear proliferation poses a significant threat to the peace
and security of humankind because of the highly destructive, shocking
nature of nuclear weapons.218 A major consequence of the undefined
nature of jus cogens norms is the absence of criteria necessary to recognize
a norm as jus cogens.219
The lack of criteria necessary to recognize a norm as jus cogens can
be used to the advantage of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. For
example, like the ICJ noted when it addressed genocide, there need not be
any “conventional obligation” to formally recognize that nuclear nonproliferation is jus cogens.220 In the case of nuclear non-proliferation, there
is not only a conventional obligation to promote nuclear non-proliferation
under the NPT, but also a psychological obligation to adhere to the norm,
as demonstrated by the opinio juris of States.221
In addition, nuclear non-proliferation’s jus cogens status is supported
by the significant number of international and regional treaties that address
the norm as well as the 191 States that are members to either one or more
of those treaties.222 The international community should explicitly define
and declare nuclear non-proliferation as jus cogens because such
declarations would likely diminish the threat posed by nuclear
proliferation, as exemplified by the jus cogens status of the prohibition of
genocide, torture, and slavery.223
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the concept of jus cogens encompasses the most
fundamental, peremptory norms in international law, the concept also
lacks precise boundaries to elevate a norm to jus cogens status.224
216. Id.
217. Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 66.
218. See supra Sections II.A, II.B., II.C.
219. See supra Section II.A.
220. See supra Section II.A.1.
221. See supra Section III.A.
222. See supra Section III.B.
223. Despite the jus cogens status of genocide, torture, and slavery, these crimes still
persist today. See supra Section II.A.
224. See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 27.
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However, a non-exhaustive list of jus cogens norms does exist.225 For
example, this list includes the prohibition of aggression, genocide, slavery,
racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture, and the right to
self-determination.226
Common factors shared by jus cogens norms include: opinio juris
reflected by the express statements and actions of States; the number of
relevant treaties and State parties to such treaties; and ad hoc international
investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators.227 In addition, jus cogens
norms are collectively defined as crimes that “affect the interests of the
world community as a whole because they threaten the peace and security
of humankind and . . . shock the conscience of humanity.”228
Nuclear non-proliferation has attained the status of a jus cogens
norm. Nuclear non-proliferation is jus cogens because of the opinio juris
reflected by States, the significant number of treaties in force that address
and promote nuclear non-proliferation, and the large number of States that
are party to such treaties.229 While there are few examples of illegal nuclear
proliferation, the example of the A.Q. Khan Network exemplifies the gap
between the legal expectation and legal reality of prosecuting violators of
jus cogens norms.230
Further, and perhaps most significantly, nuclear non-proliferation is
a jus cogens norm because the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a crime
that threatens international peace and security.231 The catastrophic
humanitarian and environmental consequences posed by nuclear weapons
was exhibited by the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan in World War
II.232 The resulting destruction of Japan not only shocked the conscience
of humanity,233 but it also led to non-proliferation initiatives that elevated
nuclear non-proliferation to jus cogens status. The international
community should explicitly define and declare nuclear non-proliferation
as jus cogens because its binding nature on all States has the potential to
diminish the threat posed by nuclear proliferation, as exemplified by the
jus cogens status of the prohibition of genocide, torture, and slavery.234

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See Draft Articles, supra note 34, at 83, para. 5.
See id.
See supra Section II.A.1.
See supra Section II.A.1.
See supra Sections III.A, III.B.
See supra Section III.C.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.A.

